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ABSTRACT. Marine is the oldest type of insurance coverage. Nevertheless, unlike cargo and
hull covers, marine liability is a rather young line of business with claims that can have very
heavy and long tails. For reinsurers, the accumulation of losses from an event insured by
various Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs is an additional source for very large claims in
the portfolio. In this paper we first describe some recent developments of the marine liability
market and then statistically analyze a data set of large losses for this line of business in a
detailed manner both in terms of frequency and severity, including censoring techniques and
tests for stationarity over time. We further formalize and examine an optimization problem
that occurs for reinsurers participating in XL on XL coverages in this line of business and give
illustrations of its solution.
1. INTRODUCTION
Marine is the oldest line of business in insurance. It goes back to the ancient civiliza-
tions of Babylonians, Greeks and Romans. These societies had systems of maritime loans
to shipowners on their ships and cargo. The borrowed money would then be paid back
with interest in case the journey went well or the loans would be forgiven in case of a loss
of the ship. Rhodian shipowners included in their law the principle of “general average”.
This principle allowed to proportionally share losses among several shipowners, when the
losses were needed to preserve the rest of the merchandise in the case of an emergency.
The first documented reinsurance contract dating from 1370 relates to the cargo of a ship
sailing from Genoa to the harbor of Sluis, for which the more dangerous part of the trip
from Cadiz to Sluis was reinsured. For a detailed description of the history of marine in-
surance, see [16, 29]. Marine insurance has naturally evolved substantially since then and
it is nowadays commonly divided into four classes of business: cargo, hull, offshore energy
and liability. Previous works as [11, 27, 29] describe the principal features and methods used
in these classes, the marine insurance market place in general, the important role of the
London market in it, as well as the exposure management that is required to control the po-
tential accumulation risk of single events. Cargo traditional coverage comprises the goods
and merchandise that is carried by the vessels. Hull protects against damages happening
to the structure and machinery of the vessels. In contrast, offshore energy and liability are
rather young markets in marine insurance, appearing at the end of the nineteenth century.
Offshore energy involves the protection of platforms, semi-submersibles and drill ships that
carry out exploration and production of oil in the sea. Finally, marine liability provides fi-
nancial support to shipowners and charterers from the risks of legal liabilities. The difficul-
ties that data availability can pose to price contracts in this market are noted in [11], partic-
ularly for contracts covering the higher layers where only very limited claim experience is
available.
One distinguishes two types of coverage provided in the marine liability insurance mar-
ket. On the one hand, Protection and Indemnity (P&I) clubs are mutuals that group together
shipowners, ship operators and charterers to pool their risks and provide coverage against
their legal liabilities to third parties for their members. Because of the high limits of liability,
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particularly involving pollution, P&I clubs also pool their risks via the International Group of
P&I Clubs (IGP&I), the trade association of the P&I Clubs. The IGP&I coordinates the clubs
pooling agreement and administers the General Excess of Loss (IG GXL) Reinsurance Con-
tract on behalf of the clubs. The IG GXL is a common reinsurance program transferred to the
commercial market to cover the highest losses to which the club members are exposed. On
the other hand, commercial (re)insurance companies additionally offer coverage for third-
party liabilities on a fixed-premium basis as well as protection for the higher layers of the
risks covered by P&I clubs (for instance also by participating in the previously mentioned IG
GXL Contract). The magnitude of total claims can be enormous (for example, in the case of
Costa Concordia exceeding a billion US$) and the settlement of some claims can take more
than a decade.
After describing some recent developments in the marine liability insurance market in
Section 2, the focus of the remaining paper is two-fold: we first give a statistical analysis of a
set of actual large losses from this line of business in Section 3, modeling both the size of the
claims and their frequency. Section 4 then describes the general framework of an insurance
market in the presence of a big reinsurance program, involving many companies, designed
to cover the largest market claims. Section 5 introduces several variants of resulting profit
optimization problems for reinsurers in this market, who participate in a large excess of
loss (XL) reinsurance contract (as the IG GXL mentioned above) and in addition reinsure
individual cedents that also participate in it. In Section 6 we give illustrations of possible
solutions to these problems and Section 7 concludes.
2. MARINE LIABILITY INSURANCE MARKET
During the last decade, IGP&I club premiums (known as “calls”) have represented bet-
ween 61% and 67% of the total marine liability premium. They amounted to US $3 billion in
2018 while commercial insurer’s marine liability premiums accounted for US $1.9 billion in
the same year, according to [27]. Marine liability coverage offered by commercial insurers on
a fixed-premium basis represented around 10% of the total P&I calls in 2011 as noted in [12].
These figures highlight the central role that P&I clubs play in the marine liability insurance
market. In fact, P&I clubs appeared in the second half of the 19th century to cover open-
ended liability risks that commercial insurers were reluctant to underwrite. Nowadays, the
IGP&I gathers thirteen P&I clubs and covers around 90% of the world fleet, cf. [12, 19]. The
thirteen clubs retain losses below an individual club’s retention (at US $10 million in 2019),
while the claims between US $10 and US $100 million are covered by Hydra, the captive of
IGP&I, and the claims above US $100 million are reinsured in the open market (see Section 4
for further details).
Regarding the frequency of marine liability large losses, it is expected to continue to de-
crease in the future. Shipping is now safer than ever, the number of total shipping losses
of vessels over 100 gross tonnage per year have fallen from 207 in 2000 to 46 in 2018 [1].
In addition, [20] illustrates that the number of oil spills of more than 700 tons has also de-
creased from an average of 24.5 per year in the 70’s to 1.9 per year after 2010. In fact, 19 of
the 20 largest spills registered since 1970 occurred before 2000 [20]. This indicates that even
with the relentless growth of the world fleet, not only the relative frequency of maritime ac-
cidents, but also the absolute number of large oil spills has dropped. Similar to motor and
aviation transport, human error is the main reason for marine casualties. Human error is the
cause of 75%-96% of marine incidents according to [1] or 70%-80% of incidents according
to [19]. The arrival of autonomous vessels in the coming decades could hence contribute to
a further reduction of marine accidents, much like the expected decrease in the number of
automobile claims.
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Conversely, the size of marine liability large losses seems to increase, see [1, 22]. First,
vessels have been continuously increasing in size. The latest container ships can carry more
than 20 000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU), which is more than 6 times the capacity of
MV Rena (3 351 TEU), which ran aground in New Zealand in 2011 (constituting one of the
most expensive historical liability losses). These larger ships lead to new and complex chal-
lenges regarding the evacuation and rescue in remote environments. They are also harder
to handle and the removal of their wrecks takes longer due to lack of salvage equipment
and technology capable of removing them. Secondly, the cost of wreck removal has risen
during this century due to various reasons such as the increase in vessel size and cargo vol-
umes. Technological advances also permit carrying out wreck removals in more challenging
and more extreme environments than before, but the costs associated with these can be im-
mense compared to past removals. Central factors to the cost of wreck removal are: the lo-
cation of the incident, cargo recovery from container ships, bunker fuel removal operations
and the influence of government or other authorities, see [22]. The last one, strengthened by
increasing environmental concern and media coverage, appears to be the dominant factor.
For instance, in the case of the Costa Concordia incident, the Italian government required
the wreck to be removed in one piece and to carry out the removal work entirely in Italy
which substantially increased the cost of the operation. Finally, the most expensive marine
liability losses are typically also associated with another factor, namely the cleaning and en-
vironmental costs when oil was spilled on the ocean. The quantity of oil spilled is relevant
but as [31] indicate, this is not the only determining factor to the cost of oil spills. Important
in this context are also the type of oil, the location and the characteristics of the affected
area.
3. MODELING MARINE LIABILITY LARGE LOSSES
We now analyze a data set collecting the information on the most expensive marine liabil-
ity claims from eight insurance companies, that occurred between 2007 and 2017, obtained
from a global reinsurance company. This set of claims includes mainly oil spills, wreck re-
movals, collisions of two or more vessels, groundings and fires on board. The amounts were
reported in 2018 and have been indexed to reflect costs at the end of that year. The consumer
price index (CPI) from the United States was used for loss indexation. Although this is a sim-
plified approach, US CPI was chosen as a proxy for global claims inflation considering the
global nature of the exposures in this line of business. It is in fact challenging to find an
index that reflects the different factors influencing this line of business, the heterogeneous
mix and global spread of the claims, the effect of local court decisions and jurisdictional
practice. We have information on the date of the incidents, paid and incurred amounts.
Ultimate amounts for claims that are still open, have been computed applying age-to-age
development factors following the chain-ladder method until the 7-th year of development
and fitting a Weibull logarithmic curve to estimate the loss development tail factors above
the 8-th year. The data set gathers aggregate claim costs across the eight companies for each
single event with incurred values above US $2.85 million. Marine liability losses caused by
natural catastrophe events such as hurricanes, earthquakes, wildfires or tsunamis, as well
as energy liability losses involving oil rigs, are excluded from the analysis. Natural catastro-
phe events are not considered because they are not one of the main drivers of the costliest
marine liability claims as it is the case for the cargo and hull coverages. Additionally, these
risks are usually evaluated by means of commercial catastrophe models that do not use past
claim experience per se. The data set has a total of 85 combined claims of which 26 are
closed. These large claims are shared among several companies. In fact, half of the claims
(43) affected at least two companies, and four claims (among them the two most expensive,
4 WILLIAM GUEVARA-ALARCÓN, HANSJÖRG ALBRECHER, AND PARVEZ CHOWDHURY
Costa Concordia and MV Rena) even involve seven of the eight companies. In the follow-
ing, we analyze the frequency and severity of this data set of claims, using the methodology
recently described in [2].
3.1. Frequency Modeling. It is usual to examine the number of claims per year when mod-
eling the frequency of claims. In such a case, generalized linear models (GLM) or general-
ized additive models (GAM) with a Poisson or negative binomial response are the common
choice. Nevertheless, in our case the data set seems to be too small to provide a useful model
along these lines, given the low frequency registered over the eleven-year period.
3.1.1. Homogeneous Poisson Process. We proceed to use the additional information on the
exact date of the incidents, to model the number of claims N (t ) up to time t as a sto-
chastic process. We use days as the time unit, having observed 4 018 days in the eleven-
year period. First, we test for a homogeneous Poisson process, with estimated intensity of
λˆ = 85/4018 = 0.0212 claims per day. We test the hypotheses of exponential inter-arrival
times and of a uniform distribution of arrival times over the entire period. These hypothe-
ses are not rejected for this data set when the Anderson-Darling (0.75 and 0.51 p-values)
and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (0.83 and 0.7 p-values) tests are applied, which indicates that
the homogeneous Poisson process could be seen as a reasonable model for the claim ar-
rival process. Figure 1 shows the exponential QQ-plot of the inter-arrival times as well as the
actual claim counts over time together with the simulated 95% confidence interval for the
homogeneous Poisson process based on 10 000 realizations. Although the tests do not reject
the distributional hypotheses on the inter-arrival and arrival times at this usual significance
level, the QQ-plot still exhibits some deviation from the exponential distribution, particu-
larly for larger inter-arrival times. Hence the hypothesis of a constant intensity during the
eleven-year period, a key property of the homogeneous Poisson process, still may not be the
most reasonable choice.
FIGURE 1. QQ-plot of the standardized inter-arrival times (left) and sim-
ulated 95% confidence intervals for a homogeneous Poisson process with
λˆ= 0.0212 and observed cumulative count claims (right).
3.1.2. Inhomogeneous Poisson Process. We hence explore the fit of an inhomogeneous Pois-
son process with intensity function λ(t ) changing over time. A Gaussian kernel estimator
for the intensity function using the arrival times Ti is used as e.g. proposed by [8]
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λˆ(t )= 1
h
n∑
i=1
K
(
t −Ti
h
)
. (3.1)
Pseudodata built through reflection at the boundaries t0 = 0 and T = 4018 of the observed
arrival times (see e.g. [5]), are used to correct for underestimation of λ(t ) near the bound-
aries. The bandwidth h is chosen applying the extensively used plug-in method in [28],
giving h = 887 as a result. Alternative plug-in and cross validation methods to determine
the bandwidth give similar results with h ∈ [680,970], however h = 360 (an annual standard
deviation) and h = 180 are also considered.
A second alternative consists of using a log-linear intensity function given by
λˆ(t )= exp(θ0+θ1t ) , (3.2)
whose MLEs are equal to θˆ0 =−3.674 and θˆ1 =−0.00009. The negative value of the parame-
ter θ1 suggests a decrease on the claims frequency over time. However, when testing the null
hypothesis H0 : θ1 = 0, through the likelihood ratio test with respect to the homogeneous
model, we obtain a p-value of 0.32, indicating no evidence to reject the hypothesis that the
process has constant intensity.
A third alternative consists of using a piecewise constant function composed by the an-
nual estimated intensities. Figure 2 (top left) shows the occurrence dates of the claims (in
the rug) as well as the estimated intensity function λˆ(t ) using a Gaussian kernel of the form
(3.1) with the mentioned values for the bandwidth (h = 180,360,887), the log-linear intensity
in (3.2) and the piecewise (annually) constant function. The estimated function using the
kernel exhibits a decreasing pattern over time, being monotone decreasing for the largest
bandwidthh = 887 while having additional periodic fluctuations for the shorter bandwidths.
The confidence intervals at 95% level for the inhomogeneous intensity estimators λˆ(t )
in Figure 2 are computed following the procedure in [25], see also [3]. For the homoge-
neous intensity the 95% confidence interval is derived from the estimates of 10 000 samples
of exponential inter-arrival times with mean 1/λˆ. The confidence intervals around the in-
homogeneous intensity estimate λˆ(t ) turn out to always contain the homogeneous estimate
λˆ = 0.0212. On the other hand, the confidence interval of the homogeneous intensity con-
tains the inhomogeneous estimate for h = 887, and the estimates for the other bandwidths
fall outside of the interval. This suggests that despite a visible decreasing pattern of the in-
tensity, the data set is not rich enough to conclude such a decrease decisively at the usual
significance level.
For the sake of completeness, we still test in the following whether for a given inhomo-
geneous Poisson estimate the inhomogeneous Poisson assumption would be justified. For
that purpose, we apply a deterministic time change to the inter-arrival times using the es-
timated intensity λˆ(t ) with bandwidth h = 887, so that the resulting process should then
follow a homogeneous Poisson pattern, and then repeat the above tests. In this case the
hypotheses of exponential inter-arrival times and uniform arrival times under the new time
scale are not rejected for both Anderson-Darling (p-values 0.82 and 0.93) and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (p-values 0.89 and 0.94) tests. Figure 3 shows the exponential QQ-plot of the trans-
formed inter-arrival times and simulated confidence intervals for the inhomogeneous Pois-
son process using λˆ(t ) as in (3.1) withh = 887, and Figure 4 depicts the corresponding results
for the piecewise (annual) constant intensity. One observes that the QQ-plot constitutes an
improvement over the one under the homogeneous Poisson assumption in both cases. Au-
tocorrelation functions, partial autocorrelation functions and Ljung Box tests suggest also
independence of the inter-arrival times.
To summarize, we observe a better fit of the inhomogeneous Poisson process to the data
set as a claim arrival model, showing a decreasing behavior of the intensity function over
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FIGURE 2. Estimated Poisson intensity function λˆ(t ) using a Gaussian kernel
with h = 180,360,887, log-linear intensity and annually constant values (top
left). Remaining plots: 95% confidence intervals of the homogeneous inten-
sity estimate λˆ = 0.0212 and the inhomogeneous intensity estimate for each
bandwidth.
time, as expected from general considerations on decreasing likelihood of incidents in this
line of business. However, there is always a trade-off with respect to model complexity, and
the statistical tests to rule out the homogeneous Poisson process turned out not to be con-
clusive for the eleven years of data available.
3.2. Severity Modeling.
3.2.1. Statistical Analysis for Ultimates. Given that the data correspond to the largest ma-
rine liability claims (above US $2.85 million), one can expect them to be heavy-tailed. We
examine the fit of four different distributions: exponential, Weibull, log-normal and Pareto,
to the ultimate values of the 85 combined claims (for the closed claims these coincide with
the final paid amounts), cf. [2, Ch.4]. Figure 5 depicts the resulting QQ-plots, which show
convex shapes for the exponential, log-normal and Weibull case, clearly indicating that the
tail of the data set is heavier than the tail of these distributions. In the Pareto QQ-plot, one
observes a linear pattern indicating that the Pareto distribution can be a good model for the
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FIGURE 3. QQ-plot of the standardized inter-arrival times after time change
(left) and simulated 95% confidence intervals for an inhomogeneous Poisson
process with λ(t ) estimated with Gaussian kernel h = 887 and observed cu-
mulative count claims (right).
FIGURE 4. QQ-plot of the standardized inter-arrival times after time change
(left) and Simulated 95% confidence intervals for an inhomogeneous Poisson
process with λ(t ) estimated as the annual average and observed cumulative
count claims (right).
severity. This is also supported by the mean excess plot in Figure 6 which shows an increas-
ing linear behavior.
All this indicates that extreme value analysis should be used to further explore the claims.
In particular, we expect the extreme value index (EVI) γ to be positive, such that one is in the
Fréchet domain of attraction, see e.g. [2, 24].
The most popular estimator of γ in this case is the Hill estimator [15]
Hk,n =
1
k
k∑
j=1
ln(Xn− j+1,n)− ln(Xn−k,n),
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FIGURE 5. QQ-plots for the ultimate values of the combined claims in excess
of US $2.85 million.
where n is the sample size, Xn−k,n is the (k+1)-largest value in the sample and k is the num-
ber of largest observations used in the estimation. The Hill estimator can be interpreted as
an estimator of the slope of a strict Pareto QQ-plot or as the maximum likelihood estimator
(MLE) of the parameter 1/α based on the strict Pareto distribution given by
F (x)= 1−
(
t
x
)α
, x > t , (3.3)
when using the Peak over Threshold (POT) approach applied to the values Y = X /t condi-
tional on X > t for a large t . If the actual tail is not strict Pareto, this estimator for γ will
be biased. One therefore often considers alternative estimators. Among them are a biased-
reduced Hill estimator designed for distributions in the Hall class (cf. [14]) and a MLE using
the POT approach based in this case on the extended Pareto distribution (EPD)
Gγ,δ,τ(x)= 1− (x(1+δ−δxτ))−1/γ, x > 1,τ< 0,δ>max(−1,1/τ),
(see e.g. [2] for details on all these estimators). Figure 7 presents the Hill, the bias-reduced
Hill and the EPD estimates as a function of k. The Hill plot exhibits a rather stable behavior,
indicating an EVI around 1. This evidences a heavy tail with even possibly infinite mean.
The bias-reduced Hill estimator shows no bias when only the largest claims are considered,
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FIGURE 6. Empirical mean excess function for the ultimate values of the
combined claims in excess of US $2.85 million.
k ∈ (1,25), while for larger values of k it evidences a slight positive bias on the Hill estimates.
The EPD estimator shows smaller values of the EVI around 0.7.
FIGURE 7. Hill (together with a 95% confidence interval), bias-reduced Hill
and EPD estimator as a function of k.
We also add an estimation of the EVI that would allow for non-positive γ values as well.
The slope of the generalized QQ-plot
(
log
(n+1
k+1
)
, log(Xn−k,nHk,n)
)
,k = 1, . . . ,n−1 generalizes
the Hill estimator to
γˆGHk,n =
1
k
k∑
j=1
ln(Xn− j ,nH j ,n)− ln(Xn−k−1,nHk+1,n).
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FIGURE 8. Generalized QQ-plot (left), generalized Hill, moment and GPD es-
timates as a function of k (right).
Another generalization of the Hill estimator is the moment estimator [7]
γˆMk,n =Hk,n +1−
1
2
1− H2k,n
H (2)k,n
−1 , with H (2)k,n = 1k k∑j=1
(
ln(Xn− j+1,n)− ln(Xn−k,n)
)2 .
Assuming that the limiting distribution of the values Y = X − t conditional on X > t for
large t is a generalized Pareto (GPD) with c.d.f. Gγ,τ(x) = 1− (1+ τx)−1/γ,1+ τx > 0, one
gets by MLE a real-valued POT estimate of γ. Figure 8 shows the generalized QQ-plot that
exhibits an increasing linear pattern with a positive slope again suggesting a distribution in
the Fréchet domain of attraction and confirming the heavy tail nature of the data. The right-
hand side of the figure contains the generalized Hill, the moment and the GPD estimates as
a function of k, all suggesting a stable behavior and supporting a positive value of the EVI
between 0.6 and 0.95, slightly smaller than the Hill estimates and around the same value as
the bias-reduced Hill and the EPD estimates.
3.2.2. Statistical Analysis with Censoring. As is not uncommon in the industry, in the pre-
vious section the ultimates for the claims were treated as if they were the final values. We
now would like to take into account the fact that most of the claims are still open and their
final value is not known yet. Concretely, we examine the estimates of the EVI of the com-
bined claims under interval censoring for the open claims with a lower truncation point
given by the reporting threshold of US $2.85 million and a lower bound given by the cumu-
lative amounts already paid. In addition, we apply two methods used in Albrecher et al. [2,
p.107] to specify upper bounds for the censored claims.
In the first method, the incurred values are used as upper bounds for the claims with at
least eight years of development (39 claims occurred before 2012, 26 of them open). The
number eight is chosen because the incurred values, after reaching the eight year of de-
velopment, turn out to be an actual upper bound of the final payments for all the closed
claims. Figure 9 presents the Hill estimator adapted for interval censoring using this first
method (see e.g. [2] for details). One identifies two levels of the EVI, around 1.1 for k > 12
and around 0.6 for k ∈ (1,10). The lower level of the EVI indicates a less heavy tail when
compared to the estimators without censoring. However, this reduction of the EVI may be
rather due to the exclusion of the most expensive claim (Costa Concordia), which occurred
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in January 2012. In fact, if the latter is added to the previous 39 claims in the analysis, the
level of the EVI goes up again substantially (cf. Figure 9). This highlights the extreme nature
of the Costa Concordia loss, which is by a factor three bigger than the second-largest loss in
the data set, and still should not be assumed to be an outlier.
FIGURE 9. Hill estimator adapted for interval censoring, with cumulative
paid amounts as lower bounds and incurred as upper bounds for claims oc-
curred before 2012 and with Costa Concordia claim added.
The second method for interval censoring proposed in [2] computes for each claim i the
ratios Ri ,d of the final cumulative paid amount (registered in 2018) over the incurred value
for each development year d . If the ratio Ri ,d is larger than 1, the incurred value in devel-
opment year d is smaller than the latest available paid amount. Thus, Ri ,d gives the factor
by which we would have to multiply the incurred value to be a reliable upper bound. The
ratio is also right-censored if the claim i is still open, thus the right endpoints of Ri ,d are
estimated per development year d using the 99.9% quantile corrected by censoring as de-
scribed in [9]. Figure 10 (left) shows the boxplots of Ri ,d and the estimated right endpoints
using the quantiles corrected by censoring, by development year. The estimated endpoints
of Ri ,d of claims with three or less years of development are still not reliable, so only claims
occurred before 2016 (72 claims, 48 of them open) are used in this case. These estimates are
not strictly decreasing for higher development years as one would initially expect, therefore
we adopt a conservative approach using the estimate of development year 5 (2.64) also for
development year 4, the estimate of development year 6 (1.37) also for development years
7 and 8 and the estimate of development year 9 (1.1) also for development years 10, 11 and
12. These incurred values scaled by the former factors are used as an upper bound for the
censored claims. The upper bounds obtained by this approach are higher than the ulti-
mate values for all open claims, except three claims for which the values are at least 96% the
amount of the ultimates. Figure 10 (right) presents the Hill estimates adapted for censoring
under the second method. We can see that in this case the EVI takes again values around 1.
Hence, taking into account the censored nature of data points indicates a value ofγ around
1 or even pointing towards an infinite mean of the underlying marine liability risk.
3.2.3. Statistical Analysis of Stationarity. So far we assumed that the severity distribution is
stationary over time. However, as mentioned in Section 2 it is expected that marine liability
claims become more expensive over the years. Hence, we apply the tests T3 and T4 recently
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FIGURE 10. Boxplots of the ratios Ri ,d for d = 1,2, . . . ,12 and right endpoints
estimates (left). The final factors used to multiply the incurred values by de-
velopment year are shown as dashed lines. Hill estimator adapted for interval
censoring, with cumulative paid amounts as lower bounds and incurred mul-
tiplied by factor as upper bounds for claims occurred before 2016 (right).
derived in [10] for the hypothesis that the EVI is constant over time, in the heavy-tailed case
(γ> 0). In this casen = 85 and we take k = 25 given that it is one of the first values after which
the Hill plot stabilizes; tests T3 (with δ = 14 ) and T4 (with m = 4) produce p-values equal to
0.32 and 0.55, respectively. Therefore, on the basis of these tests and the available data, one
would not reject the null hypothesis of a constant EVI over time.
Alternatively, one can try to fit a time-regression for the EVI of the form
γi = exp(β0+β1Ti ), i = 1, . . . ,n,
assuming that the claims follow a Pareto distribution (see e.g. [4]). The MLE of the param-
eters equal βˆ0 = −0.0139 and βˆ1 = 0.00007, respectively. The positive value of the parame-
ter β1 indicates that the EVI of the data set, and hence the heaviness of the tail, increases
over time. Fitting the regression without the Costa Concordia loss yields βˆ∗0 = −0.0566 and
βˆ∗1 = 0.00007. The value of the parameter β1 remains unchanged evidencing the same trend
towards heavier claims over time still remains in the absence of the most expensive claim,
so the result is not an artefact of that one huge claim. Figure 11 (left) shows the predicted
values γˆi when using the estimated parameters above, under the two cases with all data
and also without Costa Concordia. We note that the EVI rises from 0.95 at the beginning of
the observed period up to more than 1.3 at the end; evidencing a significant increment on
the value of this parameter. Figure 11 (right) presents the Pareto QQ-plot of the amounts
(Xi/M)1/γˆi which should be Pareto with tail index 1 if the regression model is appropriate.
This graph indicates a good fit of the regression model, improving the pattern obtained for
a constant EVI is considered (cf. Figure 5 bottom right).
To summarize, we note that the EVI for this set of marine liability claim amounts, be-
haves consistently when bias and interval censoring corrections of the Hill estimator are
considered. The EVI seems to be located between 0.7 and 1.15, giving clear evidence of the
heavy-tailed nature of the claims for this line of business, suggesting that the underlying
variance is infinite and even the underlying mean could possibly be infinite. One also saw
that conclusions are quite sensitive to the statistical method used: while the tests according
to [10] would not significantly reject stationarity over time, the regression approach of [4]
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FIGURE 11. Estimated EVI γˆi as a function of time assuming Pareto claims
(left) and Pareto QQ-plot of (Xi/M)1/γˆi (right).
does indicate the (intuitively expected) increase in the heaviness of the tail over time in a
rather convincing manner.
It is worthwhile to mention that in addition to the heavy-tailed nature of the claims, one
should also consider the effect of the accumulation and increase of insured values and forth-
coming changes in regulation and law, to properly model future exposures.
4. MARKET EXCESS OF LOSS PROGRAM FOR EXTREME LOSSES
Let us now consider an insurance market with an XL reinsurance program designed to
cover the most extreme claims appearing in the market. This is indeed the case for the ma-
rine liability insurance market, where since 1951 the IGP&I manages the IG GXL Reinsur-
ance Contract (for many years, the world’s largest reinsurance contract), to cover the high-
est liability losses to which the marine industry is exposed. The structure of this contract
is complex and changes every year1. Its retention has continuously increased during re-
cent years, passing from US $50 million in 2010 to US $100 million in 2019, cf. [19]. The
losses above the IG GXL retention are covered in four layers that are reinsured in the open
market by dozens of insurers and reinsurers that take different shares in each layer (accord-
ing to [18], 91 reinsurers worldwide participated in the contract in 2014). Some then opt to
facultatively retrocede part of their assumed exposure in order to reduce single event expo-
sures. It is worth noting that this type of reinsurance program also appears in other markets,
for instance flood insurance in the United States, where the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA) underwrites the National Flood Insurance Program’s (NFIP) Reinsur-
ance Program (in which 28 reinsurers participated in 2019) to cover flood claims in excess of
US $4 billion2. According to the design of such a reinsurance program, the expected annual
number of claims to be covered is scarce while its severity is major.
1The current structure of the IG GXL program can be looked up http://www.igpandi.org/reinsurance
2See http://www.fema.gov/nfip-reinsurance-program
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Assume that the market XL reinsurance program has H different layers, of size Lh for h =
1, . . . ,H , in excess of a retention M , that is:
1st layer: L1 xs M ,
...
...
hth layer: Lh xs (M +L1+L2+·· ·+Lh−1),
...
...
H th layer: LH xs (M +L1+L2+·· ·+LH−1).
Generally, LH < ∞, so the part of the losses in excess of M +∑Hh=1Lh (usually a very large
value) is not covered by the program. If LH =∞ the program provides unlimited coverage
for every claim. To simplify notation, we denote by Kh := L1+·· ·+Lh the cumulative sum of
the layers for h = 1, . . . ,H and define K0 := 0.
Let the random variable N denote the number of losses in the insurance market above the
threshold M > 0 and let the random variables Xi , i = 1, . . . ,N , denote the size of these losses,
which for the rest of the paper we assume to be independent and identically distributed with
c.d.f. FX , and N and Xi being independent. The aggregate value of the losses then is
S =
N∑
i=1
Xi .
Due to the large size of the reinsurance program, several insurance and reinsurance com-
panies take parts in its different layers. We consider a reinsurer r that participates in the
different layers of the market reinsurance program, as well as in the XL contracts ofC differ-
ent cedents which also participate in the program.
Remark 1. In order to avoid confusion, from here on we use the term program to refer to
the market XL reinsurance program and the term contract for the XL contracts that the rein-
surer r has with theC cedents. In marine liability insurance, the cedents regularly comprise
Lloyd’s syndicates, giving the important role of the London Market in this line of business,
while reinsurer r is typically a global reinsurer.
Let δhc denote the proportion of participation of cedent c (c = 1, . . . ,C ), in layer h of the
program. Then, the gross amount of each single loss Xi in excess of M taken by the cedent c
is given by
Xc,i =
H∑
h=1
δhc [(Xi − (M +Kh−1))+∧Lh]
=
H∑
h=1
δhc [(Xi ∧ (M +Kh))− (Xi ∧ (M +Kh−1))] , (4.1)
where X ∧u := min{X ,u}, (X −u)+ := max{X −u,0}, and the maximum gross amount per
single loss for cedent c is equal to
∑H
h=1δ
h
c Lh .
The cedents also underwrite XL contracts to reduce the impact of single extreme claims.
These contracts are reinsured by several companies in the market, among them the rein-
surer r , who takes a share ∆c ∈ [0,1] on the ucM xs dcM contract of cedent c, for some uc ,
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dc > 0. Then for each single loss Xi covered by the program, the participation of the rein-
surer r due to the portion he has to pay for the contract with cedent c is given by
Xr,c,i =∆c
[
(Xc,i −dcM)+∧ucM
]
=∆c
{
[Xc,i ∧ (dc +uc)M ]− [Xc,i ∧dcM ]
}
=∆c
{[(
H∑
h=1
δhc [(Xi ∧ (M +Kh))− (Xi ∧ (M +Kh−1))]
)
∧ (dc +uc)M
]
−
[(
H∑
h=1
δhc [(Xi ∧ (M +Kh))− (Xi ∧ (M +Kh−1))]
)
∧dcM
]}
=∆c
H∑
h=1
δhc
[(
Xi ∧khc,2
)
−
(
Xi ∧khc,1
)]
, (4.2)
with
khc,1 =min
{
max
{
M +Kh−1 , M +Kh−1+
dcM −δ1cL1−·· ·−δh−1c Lh−1
δhc
}
, M +Kh
}
,
khc,2 =max
{
min
{
M +Kh , M +Kh−1+
(dc +uc)M −δ1cL1−·· ·−δh−1c Lh−1
δhc
}
, M +Kh−1
}
.
From the above, we must require that
∑H
h=1δ
h
c Lh > dcM , otherwise Xr,c,i = 0 and the cedent
contract does not transfer any risk. In fact, from the point of view of cedent c, it makes sense
to have the XL contract such that (dc +uc)M ≤∑Hh=1δhc Lh , i.e. the retention plus the limit
being smaller than its maximum gross loss.
If the reinsurer participates in the reinsurance contracts of C different cedents and also
takes direct participation δhr in the program layer h, then for each loss Xi covered by the
program the amount he has to pay equals Xr,i+∑Cc=1 Xr,c,i . Here Xr,i is given by (4.1) with δhc
replaced by δhr and Xc,i replaced by Xr,i , and Xr,c,i is given by (4.2). The total annual loss for
reinsurer r then is
SR =
N∑
i=1
[
C∑
c=1
Xr,c,i +Xr,i
]
:=
N∑
i=1
XR,i :=
C∑
c=1
Sr,c +Sr , (4.3)
where
XR,i =
C∑
c=1
Xr,c,i +Xr,i , (4.4)
denotes the total amount that the reinsurer r has to pay for a single loss Xi (from its direct
participations and the contracts with the cedents),
Sr,c =
N∑
i=1
Xr,c,i , (4.5)
is the total annual loss the reinsurer has to pay from the contract with cedent c and
Sr =
N∑
i=1
Xr,i , (4.6)
is the total annual loss the reinsurer has to pay from his direct participations in the reinsur-
ance program.
Figure 12 illustrates the participations of reinsurer r in each single loss Xi covered under
the market XL reinsurance program.
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FIGURE 12. Reinsurer r participation in claim X covered under the market
reinsurance program (H = 3).
5. OPTIMIZATION OF THE REINSURER PARTICIPATIONS IN THE MARKET PROGRAM
5.1. Principles of Premium Calculation. Classical principles of premium calculation are
based on the idea that the actuarial premium Π[X ] for a risk X should be equal to the ex-
pected loss of the covered risk E[X ] plus a safety loading, see e.g. [21] for an extensive review.
As is quite common in the market, in the following we base our considerations on the ex-
pected value principle and the variance principle:
Expected value principle: For some θ ≥ 0,
Π[X ]= (1+θ)E[X ], (5.1)
or
Variance principle: For some β≥ 0,
Π[X ]= E[X ]+βVar[X ]. (5.2)
5.2. Risk Tolerance Limits Based on Exceedance Probabilities. Although top tier reinsur-
ers have well diversified portfolios, they are required to control the total accumulation risk
originating from extreme events in specific insurance markets. One way to do this is to de-
fine risk tolerance limits that the extreme losses cannot surpass on specific (long) return pe-
riods. For a general discussion on calibrating risk appetite in insurance see e.g. [13]. Given
the catastrophic nature of the extreme losses covered by the reinsurance program described
in Section 4, the risk tolerance limits can be based on a metric widely used in catastrophe
modeling, the occurrence exceedance probability (OEP), [see e.g. 26]. This is defined as the
probability that at least one loss exceeds t , i.e.
OEPN ,X (t ) :=P [max{X1, . . . ,XN }> t ] .
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The reinsurer then typically fixes a set of J risk tolerance limits t1 < ·· · < t J for specified
probabilities p1 > ·· · > p J ; the concrete values of the risk tolerance limits and corresponding
probabilities depend on the available capital, risk appetite and underwriting strategy of the
reinsurer. Under the i.i.d. assumption on the losses Xi , we then have the constraint that the
OEP of t j occurs with a probability smaller than p j equal to
1−p j ≤P
[
max{X1, . . . ,XN }≤ t j
]= EN
[
N∏
i=1
FXi (t j )
]
= EN
[(
FX (t j )
)N] ,
so that P−1N (1−p j )≤ FX (t j ), j = 1, . . . , J , where PN (z)= EN
[
zN
]
is the probability generating
function of N .
5.3. Profit Optimization under Risk Tolerance Limits for Extreme Losses. We now con-
sider the optimization problem to identify the participation levels δhr , h = 1, . . . ,H in the
layers and ∆c , c = 1. . . ,C in the XL contracts with the cedents that maximize the expected
annual profit of the reinsurer r . We consider a profit given by premiums minus expected
losses, subject to the set of J risk tolerance limits OEPN ,XR (t j )≤ p j , j = 1, . . . , J on the aggre-
gate risk of the portfolio. Upper participation limits of reinsurer r in the cedents’ contracts
and the program layers are denoted by ∆UP and δh,UP , h = 1, . . . ,H . These limits are in
practice determined by various factors, e.g. whether reinsurer r is a leading or a following
reinsurer, how many companies take part in the reinsurance program and how competitive
the specific insurance market is. The constrained optimization problem is then given by
max
∆c ,δhr
Π[Sr ]+
C∑
c=1
Π[Sr,c ]−
(
E [Sr ]+
C∑
c=1
E
[
Sr,c
])
, c = 1, . . . ,C h = 1, . . . ,H (5.3)
subject to P−1N (1−p1)≤ FXR (t1),
...
P−1N (1−p J )≤ FXR (t J ),
∆c ∈
[
0,∆UP
]
,δhr ∈
[
0,min
{
δh,UP ,1−
C∑
c=1
δhc
})
.
Remark 2. Note that the participations in the contracts with each cedent c and in the pro-
gram are priced separately through Π[Sr,c ] and Π[Sr ], as defined in (4.5) and (4.6). In prac-
tice, the marine liability portfolio of cedent c is typically composed of its participation in the
IGP&I reinsurance program together with another independent and less extreme marine li-
ability business. Such independent business must be added inside the calculation of the
premium Π[Sr,c ]. However, for simplicity, we consider here that the reinsurance contract
with each cedent only involves the cedent’s participation in the IGP&I program. The risk
tolerance constraints are fixed on the aggregate losses of the portfolio SR as defined in (4.3)
with frequency N and severity XR given by (4.4).
Remark 3. In practice, the reinsurance program and the contracts with the cedents are
priced at different dates. In marine liability, the IG GXL reinsurance program is in force ev-
ery year on February 20th3, while most contracts with commercial (re)insurers are renewed
on January 1st, April 1st or July 1st. The optimization problem in (5.3) can be of particu-
lar interest for the underwriting team of reinsurer r , who can evaluate before the start of
an underwriting year which would be the optimal participations needed in the reinsurance
program and cedent contracts, based on their structure in the previous year, the anticipated
3Historically, this unusual renewal date was set because it was the date when the Baltic Sea was expected to
be ice-free, an important event at the time when P&I clubs were largely concentrated in Northern Europe.
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modifications and the risk tolerance limits on the OEP according to the strategy of the com-
pany.
It is important to note that if LH <∞, the random variable XR can not exceed
MR =
C∑
c=1
[
∆c
H∑
h=1
δhc
[
khc,2−khc,1
]]
+
H∑
h=1
δhr Lh ,
with P[XR =MR ]= 1−FX (M +KH ). We then have for the constraint with the smallest prob-
ability p J that
FX (M +KH )≤ P−1N (1−p J ), (5.4)
and additional constraints with smaller probabilities p j would be irrelevant. The constraints
in the optimization problem can be expressed as linear inequalities of ∆c and δhr , such that
for τ j := F−1X
(
P−1N (1−p j )
)
P−1N (1−p j )≤ FXR (t j ),
P−1N (1−p j )≤P
[
H∑
h=1
{
C∑
c=1
∆cδ
h
c
[(
X ∧khc,2
)
−
(
X ∧khc,1
)]
+δhr [(X ∧ (M +Kh))− (X ∧ (M +Kh−1))]
}
≤ t j
]
,
H∑
h=1
{
C∑
c=1
∆cδ
h
c
[(
τ j ∧khc,2
)
−
(
τ j ∧khc,1
)]
+δhr
[(
τ j ∧ (M +Kh)
)− (τ j ∧ (M +Kh−1))]
}
≤ t j .
5.4. Profit Optimization Using the Expected Value Principle. If the reinsurer uses the ex-
pected value principle (5.1) to price the contracts he has with the cedents and its participa-
tion in the reinsurance program, the objective function of the optimization problem (5.3)
becomes
Π[Sr ]+
C∑
c=1
Π[Sr,c ]−
(
E [Sr ]+
C∑
c=1
E
[
Sr,c
])
= (1+θr )E[Sr ]+
C∑
c=1
(1+θc)E[Sr,c ]−
(
E [Sr ]+
C∑
c=1
E
[
Sr,c
])
= θrE[Sr ]+
C∑
c=1
θcE[Sr,c ], c = 1, . . . ,C h = 1, . . . ,H .
That is, the optimization problem in (5.3) is then a linear program on the variables ∆c and
δhr for c = 1, . . . ,C , h = 1, . . . ,H . For the general theory on linear programming we refer to
[23, 30]. The optimization problem in standard form has C +H decision variables and J +
C +H constraints of the generic form
max
δ
cδT
subject to AδT ≤ bT ,
δ≥ 0,
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where
δ= (δ1r , . . . ,δHr ,∆1, . . . ,∆C ) , (5.5)
c= (c1, . . . ,cH ,cH+1, . . . ,cH+C ) , (5.6)
A=

a1,1 · · · · · · a1,H+C
...
. . .
...
a J ,1 · · · · · · a J ,H+C
1 0 · · · 0
0
. . .
...
... 1 0
0 · · · 0 1

, (5.7)
b=
(
t1, . . . , t J ,δ
1,UP ∧
(
1−
C∑
c=1
δ1c
)
, . . . ,δH ,UP ∧
(
1−
C∑
c=1
δHc
)
,∆UP1 , . . . ,∆
UP
C
)
, (5.8)
with
ci = θrE[N ] [E[X ∧ (M +Ki )]−E[X ∧ (M +Ki−1)]] , i =1, . . . ,H ,
cH+i = θiE[N ]
(
H∑
h=1
δhi
[
E
[
X ∧khi ,2
]
−E
[
X ∧khi ,1
]])
, i =1, . . . ,C ,
a j ,i =
[(
τ j ∧ (M +Ki )
)− (τ j ∧ (M +Ki−1))] , j =1, . . . , J , i = 1, . . . ,H
a j ,H+i =
H∑
h=1
δhi
[(
τ j ∧khi ,2
)
−
(
τ j ∧khi ,1
)]
, j =1, . . . , J , i = 1, . . . ,C
Note that δ = 0 is always a feasible solution (no participation and no profit). Hence, a
solution to this optimization problem always exists. The dual of this program has J +C +H
decision variables andC +H constraints and can be formulated as follows
min
y
byT
subject to yA≥ c,
y ≥ 0,
where y = (y1, . . . , y J+H+C ). The dual optimization problem minimizes factors on the risk
tolerance constraints, maximum participations on the layers and cedents’ reinsurance con-
tracts, subject to the condition that the factors applied to the maximum losses are bigger
than the total profit per layer and cedent contract. Depending on the number of factors on
each side, the dual formulation of the problem can be simpler than the primal formulation.
5.5. Profit Optimization Using the Variance Principle. If the reinsurer uses the variance
principle (5.2) to price the contracts with cedents and for the participation in the reinsur-
ance program, the objective function of the optimization problem in (5.3) becomes
Π[Sr ]+
C∑
c=1
Π[Sr,c ]−
(
E [Sr ]+
C∑
c=1
E
[
Sr,c
])
= E[Sr ]+βr Var[Sr ]+
C∑
c=1
(
E[Sr,c ]+βc Var[Sr,c ]
)−(E [Sr ]+ C∑
c=1
E
[
Sr,c
])
=βr Var[Sr ]+
C∑
c=1
βc Var[Sr,c ], c = 1, . . . ,C , h = 1, . . . ,H .
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In this case, the optimization problem (5.3) is a standard quadratic program on the variables
∆c and δhr for c = 1, . . . ,C and h = 1, . . . ,H . It can be expressed with C +H decision variables
and J +C +H constraints as follows
max
δ
δDδT
subject to AδT ≤ bT ,
δ≥ 0,
with
D=

d1,1 · · · d1,H 0 · · · · · · 0
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
dH ,1 · · · dH ,H 0 · · · 0
0 · · · 0 dH+1,H+1 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
... 0 dH+2,H+2
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 0 · · · · · · dH+C ,H+C

,
and
d j ,i =βr
{
E[N ]
[
Cov[X ∧ (M +Ki ) , X ∧ (M +K j )]−Cov[X ∧ (M +Ki ) , X ∧ (M +K j−1)]
− Cov[X ∧ (M +Ki−1) , X ∧ (M +K j )]+Cov[X ∧ (M +Ki−1) , X ∧ (M +K j−1)]
]
+Var[N ][E[X ∧ (M +Ki )] E[X ∧ (M +K j )]−E[X ∧ (M +Ki )] E[X ∧ (M +K j−1)]
−E[X ∧ (M +Ki−1)] E[X ∧ (M +K j )]+E[X ∧ (M +Ki−1)] E[X ∧ (M +K j−1)]
]}
j , i = 1, . . . ,H
dH+i ,H+i =βi
{
E[N ]
[
H∑
h=1
H∑
h′=1
δhi δ
h′
i
[
Cov[X ∧khi ,2 , X ∧kh
′
i ,2]−Cov[X ∧khi ,2 , X ∧kh
′
i ,1]
−Cov[X ∧khi ,1 , X ∧kh
′
i ,2]+Cov[X ∧khi ,1 , X ∧kh
′
i ,1]
]]
+Var[N ]
[
H∑
h=1
H∑
h′=1
δhi δ
h′
i
[
E[X ∧khi ,2] E[X ∧kh
′
i ,2]−E[X ∧khi ,2] E[X ∧kh
′
i ,1]
−E[X ∧khi ,1] E[X ∧kh
′
i ,2]+E[X ∧khi ,1] E[X ∧kh
′
i ,1]
]]}
,
i = 1, . . . ,C ,
and δ, A and b defined as in (5.5), (5.7) and (5.8) respectively. As in Section 5.4, the trivial
solution δ= 0 is feasible, so that a solution to this optimization problem always exists.
6. ILLUSTRATION OF THE OPTIMIZATION FOR THE REINSURER PARTICIPATIONS
Let us assume that the frequency and severity distributions above the retention M = 100
are given by N ∼ Poisson(λ = 1.5) and Xi ∼ Pareto(α = 1.2, t = 100) in (3.3). Additionally,
let the reinsurance program have three layers H = 3 with M = 100, L1 = 500, L2 = 500 and
L3 = 1000, which corresponds to the structure of the IGP&I reinsurance program in 2017
without the collective overspill layer. We consider four cedents C = 4 with participations in
the layers and reinsurance contracts as given in Table 1, which implies the limits on the lay-
ers of the reinsurance program as given in Table 2.
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TABLE 1. Cedents participations and XL contract limits.
Cedent (c) δ1c δ
2
c δ
3
c δ
1
cL1+δ2cL2+δ3cL3 dcM ucM
1 0.05 0.04 0.03 75 10 60
2 0.01 0.04 0.09 115 20 50
3 0.05 0.00 0.04 65 20 20
4 0.00 0.06 0.00 30 15 15
TABLE 2. Cedents limits in layers.
Cedent (c) k1c,1 k
1
c,2 k
2
c,1 k
2
c,2 k
3
c,1 k
3
c,2
∑H
h=1δ
h
c
(
khc,2−khc,1
)
1 300 600 600 1 100 1 100 1 933 60
2 600 600 975 1 100 1 100 1 600 50
3 500 600 600 1 100 1 100 1 475 20
4 600 600 850 1 100 1 100 2 100 15
Additionally, consider that the reinsurer fixes OEP constraints determined by t1 = 50,
t2 = 75, t3 = 250, p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.04 and p3 = 0.01 and the maximum participations in the
layers are δ1,UP = 0.055, δ2,UP = 0.085 and δ3,UP = 0.1 and for the cedents ∆UP = 0.5. These
values of δh,UP correspond to 10% of the available market share for commercial insurers on
the corresponding layers of the IGP&I program in 2017. The results of the respective opti-
mization problem under the expected value principle are given below.
6.1. Expected Value Premium Principle. Assume initially the same safety loading for the
layers of the reinsurance program and the cedents θr = θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0.2. Then we
have
c= (45.18,11.97,11.26,1.56,0.69,0.41,0.29) ,
A=

500 314.49 0 27.58 0 5 3.87
500 500 915.26 60 50 20 15
500 500 1000 60 50 20 15
1 0 · · · · · · 0
0
. . .
...
... 0
0 · · · · · · 0 1

,
b= (50,75,250,0.055,0.085,0.1,0.5,0.5,0.5,0.5) .
The linear program can e.g. be solved with the classical simplex method developed by [6].
In this case, the optimal solution is a profit of 3.659 with the following parameters
(δ1∗r ,δ
2∗
r ,δ
3∗
r ,∆
∗
1 ,∆
∗
2 ,∆
∗
3 ,∆
∗
4 )= (0.055,0.023,0,0.5,0,0.303,0).
From the formulation of vector c in (5.6), it is clear that the optimal solution does not
change for different safety loadings as long as they remain the same for all cedents and the
constraints are equal, only the optimal profit will change proportionally to the change in
the safety loading. However, we can study the change of the solution if the same safety
loading is kept for the direct participation θr = 0.2, but a different safety loading is used for
the contracts with the cedents with θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = θ. Figure 13 shows the variation of the
optimal profit and Figure 14 gives the resulting δh∗r and ∆∗c for h = 1,2,3 and c = 1,2,3,4 as a
function of the safety loading θ ∈ [0,0.4]. We can see that when increasing the safety loading
for the contracts with the cedents from 0 to 0.4, the direct participations of the reinsurer
in the second and third layer decrease from δ2∗r = 0.072 and δ3∗r = 0.013 to 0 and they get
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FIGURE 13. Optimal profit as function of θ for θr = 0.2.
FIGURE 14. δh∗r (left) and ∆∗c (right) as function of θ for θr = 0.2.
substituted by the participation on the cedents’ contracts. It is worth noting that it is never
optimal to have a participation in the contract with Cedent 2 for the entire range of the
safety loading, even if this is the cedent with the second highest profit for the reinsurer, as
the constraints also play a role in the substitution effect in this case.
We also explore the sensitivity of the solution with respect to the values used in the risk
tolerance limits t j . In this case we define the risk tolerance limits for the same value of
p j as before but with t1 = 50b, t2 = 75b, t3 = 250b. Figure 15 shows the variation of the
optimal profit and Figure 16 presents δh∗r and ∆∗c for h = 1,2,3 and c = 1,2,3,4 as a function
of b ∈ [0.1,2.5]. Clearly, the profit is an increasing function of b, given that the higher the
tolerance limits are, the participations on the layers and the contracts can increase and lead
to more profits. We also observe an increasing behavior on δh∗r with respect to b, so that for a
sufficiently high value of the tolerance limits it is optimal to participate up to the maximum
possible value in all layers. In contrast, for ∆c the maximum value ∆UP is reached for all
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FIGURE 15. Optimal profit as function of b.
FIGURE 16. δh∗r (left) and ∆∗c (right) as function of b.
cedents for b ≥ 1.9, but the relationship among ∆∗c and b is not necessarily monotonic, as
observed for Cedents 2 and 3.
Finally, we want to evaluate the sensitivity of the parameters λ and α from the frequency
and severity distributions. Figure 17 shows the variation of the optimal profit and Figures
18 and 19 give δh∗r and ∆∗c for h = 1,2,3 and c = 1,2,3,4 as a function of α ∈ [0.7,2.5] and
λ ∈ [0.5,5]. We can observe that the profit increases for small values of α and big values
of λ. In this region the number of effective constraints reduces to one given that FX is a
decreasing function of α and P−1N increases with λ, so that equation (5.4) is only fulfilled
by p1. The direct participation of the reinsurer in the first layer is always the maximum
possible δ1,UP = 0.055, while for the other two layers it decreases to zero in the region with
fewer constraints. Nevertheless, the relationship is not monotone, and it is influenced by the
constraints and the interactions with the cedents’ contracts. The values ∆c exhibit a similar
behavior without a monotone pattern, for instance for ∆∗3 we can see that the maximum is
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FIGURE 17. Expected profit for different values of the parametersα ∈ [0.7,2.5]
and λ ∈ [0.5,5].
FIGURE 18. Optimal participations δh∗r for different values of the parameters
α ∈ [0.7,2.5] and λ ∈ [0.5,5].
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FIGURE 19. Optimal participations ∆∗c for different values of the parameters
α ∈ [0.7,2.5] and λ ∈ [0.5,5].
attained in the region with the three constraints, it decreases and is reached again before
falling down to zero.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper we analyzed data from the marine liability insurance market. For the fre-
quency modeling, we studied both homogeneous and inhomogeneous Poisson processes,
indicating a decreasing intensity over time as expected from the general trend on the ma-
rine liability market. The analysis of the claim severity clearly supports the heavy-tailedness
of the marine liability line of business. We considered various approaches for the estima-
tion of the extreme value index, including bias corrections and censoring techniques due
to many open claims, and the resulting estimate is typically around 1, implying a severity
distribution with infinite variance and possibly even infinite mean.
We then introduced a profit optimization problem that large reinsurance companies in
markets like marine liability or US flood insurance face. The profit optimization problem
becomes a linear and a quadratic program when the reinsurer uses the expected value and
the variance premium principle, respectively. We illustrated solutions for certain choices of
the involved parameters and studied the sensitivity of the optimal solution with respect to
the model parameters.
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In future research one may consider other premium principles, although the form of the
optimization problem will then typically be considerably more complicated. Risk tolerance
limits based on aggregate exceedance probabilities (AEP) instead of occurrence exceedance
probability (OEP) could also be considered, but such AEPs will lead to non-linearities in the
constraints as well. Nevertheless, if the probability of having two or more claims is very
small, OEP and AEP values are often very similar in any case, see e.g. [17]. In the present
paper, the optimization problem was formulated in terms of maximizing expected profit
given OEP risk constraints. It will be interesting in future research to also consider other
tail-risk measures, such as Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall and investigate the effects
on the optimal solutions.
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